Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
California Agencies

California Documents

4-2007

Rethinking Redevelopment Oversight: Exploring
Possibilities for Increasing Local Input
California Research Bureau

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/caldocs_agencies
Part of the Land Use Law Commons
Recommended Citation
California Research Bureau, "Rethinking Redevelopment Oversight: Exploring Possibilities for Increasing Local Input" (2007).
California Agencies. Paper 423.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/caldocs_agencies/423

This Cal State Document is brought to you for free and open access by the California Documents at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in California Agencies by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Rethinking Redevelopment .
Oversight:
Exploring Possibilities for
Increasing Local Input
CALIFORNIA
STATE LIBRARY
FOUNDED

By Grant Boyken, Senior Research Specialist

1850

California Research Bureau
900 N Street, Smte 300
P.O. Box 942837
Sacramento, CA 94237- 0001
(916) 653-7843 phone
(916) 654-5829 fax

Requested by Assembly Member Chuck DeVore

STATE DEPOSITORY
LAW LIBRARY

MAY 1 6 2007
APRIL2007
GOLDEN GATE UNNERStTY
NON-CIRCULATING

CRB07-004

KFC
811
.B69
2007

F

()

R

I

I

A

R

E

A

R

C

H

B

u

R

E

A

U

Rethinking Redevelopment
Oversight:
Exploring Possibilities for
Increasing Local Input
By Grant Boyken, Senior Research Specialist

ISBN I-58703-221-X

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Dean Miscynski, Director of the California Research Bureau for his
thorough and thoughtful review of earlier versions of this report. I would also like to
thank Katie Sarber, Megan Quirk, and Danny Chang for their assistance in the
publication of this report.
INTERNET ACCESS
This paper is available through the Internet at the California State Library's home page
(http://www.library.ca.gov/) under California Research Bureau Public Policy Reports.

Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. !
REDEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA ....................................................................... 5
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA REDEVELOPMENT LAW ............................................... 5
LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF REDEVELOPMENT LAW IN CALIFORNIA .................................. 6
CURRENT REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OVERSIGHT IN CALIFORNIA ................................... 7

Litigation ..................................................................................................................... 7
Referendum ................................................................................................................. 8
Redevelopment agency reporting requirements .......................................................... 8
Project Area Committees ............................................................................................ 9
II. CONSIDERING ARBITRATION AS AN OVERSIGHT MECHANISM FOR
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES ................................................................................ 11
What types of redevelopment-related disputes might be settled with arbitration? ... 12
Time lines ................................................................................................................... 14
Who could bring a dispute to arbitration? ............................................................... 15
How many arbitrators? ............................................................................................. 16
Selecting arbitrators ................................................................................................. 17
Rules and procedures for arbitration proceedings ................................................... 18
Responsibility for costs and fees of arbitration proceedings .................................... 19
EXPANDED PROJECT AREA COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT ................................ 21
San Francisco Bay Area project area committees .................................................... 21
The Russian River Redevelopment Oversight Committee ......................................... 22
Are Bay Area PACs and the Russian River Redevelopment Oversight Committees
models that can be replicated elsewhere? ................................................................ 23
APPENDIX: ARBITRATION ....................................................................................... 25
WHAT IS ARBITRATION? ................................................................................................. 25
TYPES OF ARBITRATION ................................................................................................. 25

Consumer arbitration ................................................................................................ 25
Labor and employment arbitration ........................................................................... 27
International arbitration ........................................................................................... 2 7
Judicial arbitration ................................................................................................... 28
WHY USE ARBITRATION? .............................................................................................. 28
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (FAA): KEY PROVISIONS ......................................... 29

Validity of arbitration agreements ............................................................................ 29
Appointing arbitrators .............................................................................................. 30
Subpoenas by arbitrators .......................................................................................... 30
Confirming, vacating, or modifying an award ......................................................... 30
THE CALIFORNIA ARBITRATION ACT: KEY PROVISIONS ................................................ 31

Validity of arbitration agreements ............................................................................ 31
Class arbitration ....................................................................................................... 31
Appointment and (dis)qualification of arbitrators .................................................... 32
Confirming, vacating, or modifying an award ......................................................... 32
NOTES ............................................................................................................................. 35
Califomia Research Bureau, Califomia State Library

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For local governments in California, redevelopment is one of the principal tools available
for revitalizing areas that are physically or economically blighted. The statutory purpose
of redevelopment agencies is to make improvements to blighted areas "in the interest of
the health, safety, and general welfare of the people ... and of the state" (California Health
and Safety Code, Section 33030).
After a redevelopment area is established, a redevelopment agency uses tax increment
financing to "freeze" the amount of property tax revenues that other local governments
receive from property in that area . The majority of the increases in property tax
revenues go to the redevelopment agency for the life of the project. However, tax
revenues produced by some types of tax rate increases are allocated to the taxing entity
rather than the redevelopment agency, and redevelopment agencies are required to "pass
through" to other local taxing agencies a portion of the tax increment that is determined
by statutory formulas. Redevelopment agencies may issue bonds to finance
redevelopment and use revenue from future tax increments to repay debt. During fiscal
year 2004/2005, there were 422 redevelopment agencies in California, and 760
redevelopment project areas.
In recent years, redevelopment agencies have been the subject of significant criticism and
scrutiny. Critics have raised questions about the value and necessity of redevelopment,
and the use of tax increment financing which diverts increases in local property taxes
away from other local taxing entities. Redevelopment agencies have been charged with
making questionable declarations of blight and criticized over the use of eminent domain
to support private development. Concerns have also been raised about the lack of formal
redevelopment oversight mechanisms.
Redevelopment officials, like city council members and officials on other governing
bodies, are appointed to make policy decisions. Certain types of decisions, because of
their particular sensitivity or potential impact, are subjected to a higher standard of
review. Some decisions require a "super majority" of the governing body. In some
instances, opposing parties may subject the decisions of a governing body to a
referendum or appeal to the courts.
With respect to redevelopment, critics have argued that the costs of litigation and the
referendum process, as well as the timelines for filing referendum petitions or legal
challenges, prohibit the use of these mechanisms. The purpose of this report is to
examine what other types of mechanisms might increase the input of local citizens and
governments in redevelopment decisions.
Due to concerns about the use of redevelopment in the wake of significant public concern
over the decision in Keto v. City of New London (2005/- in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the taking of private property for the purpose of private development (as
part of a redevelopment project) satisfied the constitutional "public use" requirementthe California Legislature held a series of joint interim hearings on redevelopment reform
California State Library, California Research Bureau

in the fall of2005. As a result, in 2006 the legislature passed several bills to reform
redevelopment practices. Perhaps most notably, SB 1206 (Kehoe) narrowed the statutory
definition of "blight," contained provisions to increase state oversight of redevelopment,
and made it easier to challenge redevelopment plans through litigation or by referendum.
Assembly member Chuck DeVore requested that the California Research Bureau conduct
further study of oversight mechanisms for redevelopment agencies. The principal
question addressed in this report is how local citizens and governments can exercise
greater input in redevelopment decisions.
A logical starting point might be to examine the possibility of county oversight. Over the
years, there has been some interest in granting redevelopment agency oversight
responsibilities to Local Agency Formation Commissions (LAFCOs) or to some other
body that represents the interest of the counties in which redevelopment agencies operate.
Counties certainly have a financial incentive in exercising oversight. Redevelopment
diverts (to redevelopment agencies) a significant portion of property tax revenue that
would otherwise go to counties.
In 1983, AB 322 (Costa) established a form of oversight mechanism by requiring new
redevelopment project areas to be reviewed by fiscal review committees composed of
local taxing agencies. If, through the fiscal review committee process, other local
agencies could show "financial burden or detriment," a redevelopment agency could
share its property tax increment revenues with other agencies through "pass-through
agreements." Critics, however, suggested that these agreements often protected the fiscal
interests of local agencies while nonetheless allowing questionable redevelopment
projects to proceed. 2 Eventually, the Redevelopment Law Reform Act of 1993 (AB
1290, Isenberg) repealed the fiscal review committee process and established statutory
formulas to determine "pass-through" payments.
Could LAFCOs play an oversight role in the adoption of redevelopment plans?
LAFCO'S were established in 1963 to replace county boundary commissions. The courts
have described LAFCOS as the legislature's "watchdog over local boundaries."
Although redevelopment project areas are a type ofboundary, staff members from the
local government committees of the Assembly and the Senate suggest that redevelopment
oversight would be a significant departure from LAFCOs' existing statutorily defined
role of overseeing boundaries between, not within, local jurisdictions. Nonetheless,
redevelopment disputes typically involve issues that are related to LAFCOs' mission of
improving coordination among local governments and encouraging efficient and effective
growth.
The focus of this report is primarily on arbitration rather than county oversight.
Assembly member DeVore requested that the California Research Bureau examine the
idea of binding arbitration as a means to settle disputes that arise from the use of
redevelopment funds.
The first section ofthis report provides a description of California redevelopment law,
including recent reform legislation and existing oversight mechanisms.
2
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The second section examines how arbitration might be established in the context of
redevelopment disputes. Two possibilities are outlined:
1. Arbitration as an alternative to litigation in cases where opponents challenge the
legal validity of redevelopment plans.
2. Some form of arbitration might be adopted that would formalize the process by
which local residents, businesses, or community groups provide input into
redevelopment plans.
The report concludes with a section that considers increasing the effectiveness of
redevelopment project area committees (PACs) by making key changes such as:
•

Broadening the criteria that require redevelopment agencies to form project area
committees (PACs).

•

Broadening PAC membership, possibly to include representatives of affected
taxing agencies.

•

Making it more difficult for redevelopment agencies to override PAC
recommendations, perhaps allowing P ACs to initiate some form of arbitration
proceedings when an impasse is reached with the agency.

California State Library, California Research Bureau
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REDEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA REDEVELOPMENT LAW

Redevelopment is a tool created by state law to assist local governments in eliminating
blight by rehabilitating residential, commercial, industrial, and retail development in a
designated area. In general, blight is defined as physical and economic conditions within
an area that cause a reduction, or lack, of proper utilization of that area.
The California Community Redevelopment Law (California Health and Safety Code,
Section 33000 et seq.) provides that any county or city can establish a redevelopment
agency by the action of its governing body. In all but a few agencies in California, the
local governing body also serves as the redevelopment agency board. In a handful of
cities and counties, the redevelopment agency is a separate body comprised of members
appointed by elected officials.
The California Community Redevelopment Law prescribes the powers of a
redevelopment agency. An agency may prepare and carry out plans for the improvement,
rehabilitation, and redevelopment of blighted areas. A redevelopment plan provides the
agency with powers to take certain actions such as purchasing and selling land within the
area covered by the plan (project area), improving dilapidated facilities, and using tax
increment financing.
Redevelopment activities may include the rehabilitation/reconstruction of existing
structures, the redesign/re-planning of areas with inefficient site layout, the demolition
and clearance of existing structures, the construction/rehabilitation of affordable housing
and the construction of public facilities including, public buildings, streets, sidewalks,
sewers, storm drains, water systems, and street lights.
A redevelopment plan is adopted by ordinance of the governing body of the community.
Adoption of the plan is based on the recommendations of the agency, the planning
commission, and the project area or redevelopment advisory committee (if formed). The
project area must first be presented at a public hearing (giving citizens who will be
included in the project area a chance to express their views) after which the
redevelopment agency acts on the adoption of the project area and becomes primarily
responsible for carrying out the plan.
Redevelopment is financed primarily by tax increment revenue. Other revenue sources
include loans, grants and the issuance of tax allocation bonds. California voters adopted
Article XVI, Section 16 of the California Constitution in 1952, providing for tax
increment financing. Tax increment financing is based on the assumption that a
revitalized project area will generate more property taxes than were being produced prior
to redevelopment. When a redevelopment project area is adopted, the current assessed
values of the property within the project area are designated as the base year value. Tax
increment comes from the increased assessed value of property, not from an increase in
tax rate. Any increases in property value, as assessed because of change of ownership or
California State Library, California Research Bureau

new construction, will increase tax revenue generated by the property, the majority of
which goes to the agency.
Taxing entities such as the county, school districts, and special districts that serve the
project area, continue to receive all the tax revenues they were receiving the year the
redevelopment project was formed (the base year). In addition, taxing entities receive a
portion of the incremental increase in property tax revenues from a redevelopment project
area.
The California Community Redevelopment Law requires that no less than 20 percent of
tax increment revenue derived from a redevelopment project area be used to increase,
improve, and preserve the supply of housing for very low-, low- and moderate-income
households.
LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF REDEVELOPMENT LAW IN CALIFORNIA

Due to concerns about redevelopment agency activities, there have been a number of
legislative reforms designed to change, and add some oversight, to redevelopment agency
practices.
In the 1970s, the Legislature responded to concerns that redevelopment projects caused a
loss of affordable housing. Legislation required redevelopment officials to replace
affordable housing that they destroyed (AB 4473, Sieroty, 1976). Redevelopment
agencies must also set aside 20 percent oftax increment revenues for the construction and
rehabilitation of affordable housing (AB 3674, Montoya, 1976). At least 30 percent of
housing units developed by the redevelopment agency, and 15percent of those developed
by builders other than the redevelopment agency must be affordable to low- and
moderate-income households (AB 1018, Sieroty, 1975).

After the passage ofProposition 13 and the resulting reduction of property tax revenues,
cities had a strong incentive to use their redevelopment authority to promote development
that produced sales tax revenues and to capture a larger share of property tax revenues. 3
4
The number of redevelopment agencies and project areas grew significantly. County
officials expressed concern that cities were declaring agricultural areas and open space
land blighted and including those properties in redevelopment project areas. Legislators
responded by banning "bare land projects" and by requiring fiscal review committees
composed of local taxing agencies to review proposed new project areas (AB 322, Costa,
1983).
A decade later, another important redevelopment reform bill was passed (AB 1290,
Isenberg, 1993). The bill, which was sponsored by the California Redevelopment
Association, narrowed the statutory definition of blight and set time limits on
redevelopment projects.

6
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AB 1290 also repealed the fiscal review committee process, which redevelopment
agencies had used to settle, or avoid, lawsuits by negotiating deals with counties and
school districts to "pass through" large portions of their share of property tax revenue to
these taxing entities. As an alternative to fiscal review committees, AB 1290 established
a set of statutory formulas to determine pass-through payments.
In 2006, the passage ofSB 1206 (Kehoe) established further reforms. The bill narrowed
the statutory definition of blight. It increased state oversight by requiring redevelopment
agencies to submit preliminary reports to the Department of Finance (DOF) and the
Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) 45 days prior to public
hearings on proposed amendments and adoptions. It also required the DOF to estimate
certain effects of the proposed adoption or amendment.
SB 1206 makes it somewhat easier to challenge redevelopment plans. It increases the
statute of limitations on a legal action challenging a redevelopment plan from 60 to 90
days and increases the time for submitting a referendum petition on an ordinance
adopting or amending a redevelopment plan from 30 to 90 days.
The passage ofSB 53 (Kehoe) in 2006 requires redevelopment plans to specify how,
when, and where eminent domain powers will be used, and prohibits redevelopment
agencies from amending a redevelopment plan without first documenting new findings of
blight.
CURRENT REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OVERSIGHT IN CALIFORNIA

Although there is no formal system of review or approval of redevelopment plans beyond
the agency and the city or county that created it, the Community Redevelopment Law
provides for several oversight mechanisms. Challenges can be brought against
redevelopment agencies through litigation or through a referendum process. In addition,
the law requires redevelopment agencies to report certain activities to the DOF and the
DHCD. In some cases, redevelopment agencies are also required to form Project Area
Committees to oversee plan adoptions and a limited range of redevelopment activities.
Litigation
A 1994 report by the Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO) found that oversight of
redevelopment agency activities comes primarily through legal challenges or referenda
initiated by three parties: 5
•

Local taxing agencies including the counties, special districts, and school and
community college districts serving the redevelopment project area.

•

The state, primarily the state DOF.

•

The public, which includes local residents and businesses.

California State Library, California Research Bureau

Referendum
Local residents may also challenge the adoption or amendment of a redevelopment plan
by referendum. The law specifies that referendum petitions of all cities and counties
must be submitted to the clerk of the legislative body within 90 days of the adoption of
ordinance subject to adopt or amend a redevelopment plan. 6 A 1994 study published by
the California LAO found that even though local residents and businesses frequently
commented on proposed redevelopment activities, few pursued their challenges in court
or through the referendum process. 7
In an attempt to make the referendum process more accessible, the passage of SB 546
(Torkalson) in 2004 increased the time period in which a referendum petition could be
filed from 30 days to 90 days for petitions circulated in cities or counties with
populations greater than 500,000. SB 1206, which was passed in 2006, extends the 90day time period to petitions circulated in all cities and counties, regardless of population
SIZe.

Redevelopment agency reporting requirements
California law requires redevelopment agencies to file annual reports with the legislative
body and the state that describe agency finances and provide information regarding the
provision of housing for low- and moderate-income persons. 8 Agencies are required to
file an annual financial report with the local legislative body and with the State
Controller. The legislature also requires redevelopment agencies to file an annual report
with the California DHCD that provides specific information on agency activities that
affect housing such as displacement, housing units destroyed, and housing units
constructed.
Based on redevelopment agencies' financial audit reports, the State Controller is required
to compile a list of agencies that appear to have major violations of the Community
Redevelopment Law. In cases where violations are found, the law establishes a
procedure for consultation between the State Controller's Office and redevelopment
agency, referral of the violation to the Attorney General, a court hearing, and the issuance
of court orders and fines designed to remedy violations.
Of the 422 redevelopment agencies that existed during the 2004/05 fiscal year, the State
Controller's Office found 86 major violations based on the annual reports filed by the
agencies. Of these, 51 (60 percent) were for failing to adopt an implementation plan,
which the law requires agencies to adopt every five years. Thirteen (15 percent) of the
major violations were for failing to file an audit report, and another eight (9 percent) were
for a "lack of findings for administrative expenditures from the Low and Moderate
Income Housing Fund." The remaining 14 violations (16 percent) were for failing to
initiate development, failing to file an annual report with the Controller's Office, not
establishing time limits on incurring/repaying debt and on the duration of the plan, and
for failing to accrue interest to the Low and Moderate Income Housing Fund.

8
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Other than these finding, the state has taken few steps to enforce statutory requirements.
A 2005 LAO report found that the Department of Finance had only used its authority to
challenge proposed redevelopment projects once. The same report found that the
Attorney General had done so only twice. 9
Project Area Committees

California redevelopment law provides for the formation of project area committees to
10
oversee plan adoptions and a limited range of redevelopment activities. Under the law,
redevelopment agencies are required to form a project area committee if: (1) "a
substantial number of low- or moderate-income persons, or both, live within the project
area, and the redevelopment plan will give the redevelopment agency the authority to
acquire residential property by eminent domain;" or (2) "the redevelopment plan contains
one or more public projects that will displace a substantial number of low- and/or
moderate-income persons."
If a redevelopment agency does not form a PAC, the agency must adopt a resolution
making a finding that the formation of a PAC is not required. A statement of the specific
reasons why the project will not displace a significant number oflow- and/or moderateincome persons should support the finding. If a PAC is not formed, the agency must
consult with residents and community organizations before the redevelopment plan is
adopted. If a PAC is to be formed, the law contains a number of provisions that require
the agency to adopt procedures to publicize the opportunity to serve on the PAC and to
assist with its formation.
PAC membership is limited to elected representatives of residential owner-occupants,
residential tenants, business owners, and existing organizations within the project area.
Each represented organization must appoint one of its members to the committee.
Neither the legislative body, nor the redevelopment agency may appoint a committee
member. The election of committee members must be held within 100 days after the
preliminary plan for a project area is adopted.
PACs serve as advisory bodies to redevelopment agencies. Redevelopment plans must
be submitted to a PAC, which reviews the plans and may prepare a report and make
recommendations. If a PAC recommends against the approval of a redevelopment plan,
the legislative body of the redevelopment agency may only adopt it by a two-thirds vote.
The redevelopment agency must consult with the PAC on matters related to the planning
and provision of residential facilities displaced by the project and on other policy matters
affecting residents within the project area. The agency must continue to consult with the
PAC for at least three years after the plan is adopted.

California State Library, California Research Bureau
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CONSIDERING ARBITRATION AS AN OVERSIGHT MECHANISM
FOR REDEVELOPMENT AGENCIES
Assemblyman Chuck DeVore's request directed the California Research Bureau to
determine:
•

Who the interested parties would be in a dispute;

•

Who would settle the dispute; and

•

How arbitration would work if applied to redevelopment agencies.

This section addresses these issues by examining existing California arbitration statutes
and the American Arbitration Association's (AAA) procedures for large complex
commercial cases, and considering how those laws and rules might be applied to disputes
that arise from redevelopment.
The appeal of arbitration is that it has the potential to be less costly and quicker than
litigation. It should be noted, however, that arbitration is typically used to settle disputes
related to commerce. The decision to arbitrate disputes is agreed upon within the context
of a contractual relationship between parties. 11 In the commercial context, part of the
appeal of arbitral proceedings is that they are generally private. 12 In a sense, arbitration
can be viewed as an "opting out" of the public forum of conventional courts into a more
private forum of dispute resolution. 13 Unlike litigation, pleadings are not publicly filed,
arbitration sessions are closed, and decisions are not released to anyone other than the
parties. 14 Because redevelopment is a matter of public policy with impacts that reach
beyond disputing parties, it follows that the rules and procedures should be designed with
the goal of creating proceedings that are more open and accessible than is the case in
commercial arbitration.
A number of California statutes allow for, prescribe, or limit, arbitration as a means of
settling consumer, commercial, labor, and regulatory disputes in a variety of substantive
areas. Some of the statutes simply list arbitration as an option that parties may choose for
settling disputes, but stop short of specifying how arbitrators should be chosen or the
rules that should govern the proceedings. At the other end of the spectrum, some of the
statutes contain detailed language that cover aspects of the entire dispute resolution
process from initiating arbitration proceedings and selecting arbitrators, to awards and
appeals.
In addition to California laws, the discussion in this section also refers to the American
Arbitration Association's (AAA) procedures for large complex commercial cases. A
number of California statutes require or recommend the use of AAA procedures and/or
AAA-affiliated arbitrators. The AAA has developed procedural guidelines for various
types of arbitral disputes. AAA's procedures for large, complex commercial disputes are
perhaps best suited to redevelopment disputes, due to the complexity and the potential
magnitude of the financial impact ofthese cases.

California State Library, California Research Bureau

What types of redevelopment-related disputes might be settled with arbitration?
California law currently provides for arbitration in cases where there is a dispute over the
amount of compensation that a redevelopment agency or other public entity must provide
15
when acquiring property through the use of eminent domain power. As with litigation
in these cases, the property owner is compensated for all costs associated with the
proceedings.
Arbitration could also be used in two additional contexts including:
•

As an alternative to the courts in disputes over whether redevelopment plans and
redevelopment activities conform to the law; and

•

To provide a means for local citizens and governments to be meaningfully
involved in the planning process prior to the adoption or amendment of a
redevelopment plan.

For disputes involving claims related to the validity of redevelopment plans and
redevelopment activity (i.e., claims that a redevelopment agency has violated existing
statutes) although there is currently no provision in the law that allows for arbitration,
parties that challenge redevelopment agencies could be given the option to submit their
disputes to a binding arbitration process. An arbitrator (or arbitrators) would be selected
to settle disputes that would otherwise be handled through litigation.
For these types of cases, however, arbitration is probably less desirable than litigation. In
a sense, arbitration can be viewed as "opting out" of the public forum of conventional
courts into a more private realm of dispute resolution. 16 This is often desirable in
commercial disputes, but not for redevelopment disputes that involve public funds and
public impacts. Another reason to favor litigation in these cases is that arbitral awards do
not set precedence for decisions in future disputes- there is no "law of arbitration." 17
With litigation, judges' decisions shape public policy by specifying the meaning and
application of the statutes.
It might be more worthwhile to consider the possibility of establishing some form of
arbitration procedure for settling disputes that are related to the scope, purpose, and
details of a redevelopment plan before the plan is adopted. Currently, challenges that are
brought against redevelopment agencies by referenda or through litigation cannot be
initiated until a redevelopment plan or amendment is adopted. It seems, however, that
the establishment of some formal mechanism to allow local citizens and governments
more leverage to influence redevelopment issues such as project area size and
boundaries, land uses, proposed projects, and financing could potentially allay local
concerns about redevelopment and stave off challenges that occur after a plan is adopted.

Any proposal to adopt some type of arbitration process to address disputes over the scope
and purpose of a redevelopment plan prior to adoption, however, would likely be met
with strong opposition from redevelopment agencies. Establishing such an arbitration
process would give local taxing agencies and citizens a formal role in shaping
redevelopment plans that they have not previously enjoyed.

12
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Despite likely opposition, if an arbitration process were established to settle disputes
related to the scope and purpose of redevelopment plans, it might be useful to consider
some form of tiered dispute resolution process that includes an initial mediation period
prior to arbitration, similar to the model used in collective bargaining disputes.
According to a representative from the American Arbitration Association:

... this type of issue [redevelopment disputes} would seem to lend itself well to an
initial mediation attempt. If the types ofdisputes that arise are largely
foreseeable and usually involve many of the same repeat players, a conflict
resolution system could be designed and adopted by all the agencies and other
likely stake-holders (environmental groups, etc.) in a pre-dispute environment -something along the lines of what is done on large construction projects, where
everyone knows that disputes will inevitably arise and the resolution process is
agreed to by all before the project even starts. Arbitration might work for
valuation disputes once a redevelopment area has been designated. 18
A useful model for this approach can be found in laws that govern collective bargaining
disputes, which sometimes require a mediation period prior to arbitration. Under interest,
or contract, arbitration, a union and employer that cannot agree on a contract typically go
through mediation, which involves a neutral third party who listens to each party
separately and makes suggestions to narrow differences and allow the parties to reach a
voluntary settlement. If necessary, the dispute continues to binding arbitration, in which
a neutral party proposes a settlement by recommending one of the party's final offers at
the bargaining table.
Another example of this type of tiered arbitration approach, one that perhaps most closely
parallels redevelopment disputes between counties and municipal redevelopment
agencies, is the dispute resolution process for property tax exchange agreements between
California cities and counties. Before a city can annex territory, it must negotiate a
property tax exchange agreement with its county. Section 99 of California's Revenue
and Taxation Code provides a three-step process to resolve disputes related to property
tax exchange agreements between a city and a county when the city annexes territory:
1. If the city and county cannot reach an agreement after an initial 60-day
negotiation period, they must choose a mutually acceptable third-party consultant
who has 30 days to provide a fiscal analysis.
2. If no agreement has been reached at the end of this analysis period, the two parties
must submit to a 30-day mediation period with a mutually selected mediator.
3. If mediation does not produce an agreement, the two parties must present their
last and best offers to a mutually selected arbitrator who, at the end of the 30-day
arbitration period, selects one of the offers and recommends it to the governing
bodies of the city and county.
According to a Senate Local Government Committee analysis, this three-tiered dispute
resolution process for property tax exchange agreements has never been used, but may
California State Library, California Research Bureau

have prevented disputes between cities and counties that would not have otherwise
reached an agreement. 19 The analysis suggests that prior to the establishment of the
dispute resolution process, a county could effectively veto a city annexation by refusing
to agree to a property tax exchange. It is possible that having the process in place makes
counties more willing to negotiate with their cities rather than have an agreement dictated
by an arbitrator. As this example suggests, one possible advantage of a multi-tiered
approach to dispute resolution is that by first giving parties the opportunity to negotiate a
resolution on their own, they may ultimately be more satisfied with the outcome.
Timelines
Timelines are often imposed to limit the length of time between the decision to arbitrate
and the hearing date, the length of hearings, and the length of time between the
conclusion of the hearing and the written award.
In commercial disputes, timelines are generally imposed by arbitrators (if not previously
agreed upon by contract) or through negotiations between the parties after the dispute has
arisen. The American Arbitration Association does not have specific guidelines in terms
oftimelines for large commercial cases, but instead leaves it to the arbitrators to take
steps to "avoid delay and to achieve a just, speedy and cost-effective resolution."
Similarly, some sections of California Law that require, or provide for, arbitration leave
timelines to the discretion of the arbitrator. For example, Section 7085.5 of the
California Business and Professions Code, which allows for arbitration in complaints
arising from work conducted by licensed contractors, directs arbitrators to guide the
discovery process and schedule hearings in a manner that is "consistent with the
expedited nature of arbitration," and that will "permit full and expeditious presentation of
the case."
Some sections of California Law do specify timelines for arbitration proceedings. For
example, under Section 1428(c) and 1428(d) of the California Health and Safety Code,
long-term care facility licensees that wish to contest a citation or proposed assessment of
a civil penalty by the Department of Health Services may elect to submit the matter to
arbitration. The arbitration hearing must be set between 28 to 45 days of the election to
arbitrate. At the discretion of the arbitrator, the hearing may be continued up to 15
additional days.
Similarly, Section 2685 et seq. of the California Labor Code defines the procedures for
mandatory arbitration of pricing and product quality disputes arising out of written
contracts between manufacturers and contractors. Section 2686 specifies that upon the
written request to arbitrate made by a manufacturer or contractor, the Department of
Industrial Relations will appoint an arbitration panel. Within seven days of appointment,
the chairperson of the arbitration panel will notify the parties of the date, time, and
location of the hearing, which must be scheduled no later than 21 days after the filing of
the request for arbitration. The arbitration panel has 15 days after the conclusion of the
hearing to make a written award. The party or parties that are required to comply with
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the terms of the award have 10 days in which to comply and to file proof of compliance
with the commissioner.
If the purpose of creating some form of arbitration mechanism for redevelopment
disputes is to reduce the time and cost that would be required to resolve disputes in court,
it seems that some form of time lines might be warranted. Allowing a 90-day period in
which to initiate arbitration proceedings would be consistent with California Health and
Safety Code, Section 33501. This section of the law establishes a statutory limitation of
90 days for initiating legal actions to challenge redevelopment plan adoptions,
amendments and redevelopment agency findings or determinations. Consideration
should also be given to developing timelines for setting a hearing date, the length of
hearings, and for the award and appeal process.
Who could bring a dispute to arbitration?
A Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO) report notes that challenges to redevelopment
could potentially come from the following parties: 20
•

Local taxing agencies including the counties, special districts, and school and
community college districts serving the redevelopment project area.

•

The state. Redevelopment projects rely heavily on the schools' share of property
taxes. Recognizing the need to protect the financial interests of the state, which
must reimburse schools for property tax revenues that go to redevelopment
agencies, California redevelopment law names the Department of Finance (DOF)
and, with the passage of SB 1206 (Kehoe) in 2006, the Attorney General as
interested parties in any action brought with regard to the validity of an ordinance
adopting a redevelopment plan.

•

Members of the public, including local residents and businesses and
environmental groups that raise concerns about whether a redevelopment plan is
consistent with their desires or meets environmental laws.

In practice, however, the LAO report notes that counties are the most likely party to
challenge redevelopment agencies. Other taxing agencies tend not to have the fiscal
incentive to do so. The DOF has not played an active role in challenging redevelopment
agencies. Local residents and businesses, according to the report, seldom pursue
redevelopment agencies through either litigation or the referendum process.
It is instructive to examine how the law defines interested parties to redevelopmentrelated disputes. According to California Health and Safety Code, Section 33501(c), in
order to protect the interests of the state, the Attorney General and the DOF are interested
persons in any action brought with respect to the validity of an ordinance adopting or
amending a redevelopment plan. For the purpose of contesting the inclusion of restricted
land, or agricultural land in a project area, Section 33501(d) names the following as
interested parties in legal challenges to the validity of a redevelopment plan:
•

The Department of Conservation.
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•

The county agricultural commissioner.

•

The county farm bureau.

•

The California Farm Bureau Federation.

•

And agricultural entities and general farm organizations.

Section 33501.2 requires parties who challenge redevelopment plans, with the exception
of the Attorney General, to present the grounds for the challenge, and object to the
decision of the agency or the legislative body, prior to the close of the public hearing
is required for the adoption or amendment of a redevelopment plan.
As far as the public, the courts have placed substantial limits on the class of persons who
are eligible to challenge the adoption or amendment of a redevelopment plan. Torres v.
City of Yorba Linda (1993) addressed the issue of who has legal standing to bring a
complaint against a redevelopment plan adoption. 21 The plaintiffs in the case did not live
or own property in the city that had adopted the plan. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs
challenged the adoption of a redevelopment plan by arguing that that they could be
harmed by decreased county funds for social services. The court decided against the
plaintiffs and held that because tax increment revenues are generated through
improvements that would not occur without redevelopment, and because the fiscal review
committee process established by law protects affected taxing agencies and county
residents, the plaintiffs suffered no harm.
The plaintiffs in Torres also argued that their status as taxpayers, having paid both
property and sales taxes in the county, established their standing in the dispute. The court
held, however, that having paid property taxes was insufficient to distinguish them from
most other county residents, and that having paid sales tax was also insufficient because a
sales tax is a tax on the retailer, not the consumer.
If some form of arbitration were created either as an alternative to litigation over the
validity of redevelopment plans or as a means of increasing local input in the planning
process prior to the adoption of redevelopment plans, some consideration should be given
to the question of who could initiate or participate in the proceedings. If the goal is to
increase input in redevelopment, it might be necessary to consider broadening
participation beyond the groups or persons that the courts consider to have standing to
file complaints against redevelopment agencies.
How many arbitrators?
Arbitration proceedings are generally administered by a single arbitrator or by a panel of
three arbitrators. Because increasing the number of arbitrators adds to the costs of
proceedings, decisions about the number of arbitrators must weigh both the need for a
full and thorough review of the dispute, as well as concerns about cost effectiveness.
As a general rule, single arbitrators are used for disputes that are less complex and
involve smaller awards while panels are preferred for disputes that are more complex.
For example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) procedures mandate that
16
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arbitration agreement does not specify the number of arbitrators, and if the case is worth
less than $75,000, there will only be one arbitrator. 22
The AAA's large case procedures require three arbitrators for cases worth more than $1
23
million. Based on this logic, a panel of three arbitrators would probably be desirable
for the arbitration of redevelopment-related disputes, which are arguably quite complex
and involve large sums of money. When a panel of three arbitrators is used, the two
parties can each independently select one arbitrator. The third, or neutral, arbitrator is
typically selected through a process that requires both parties, or their selected arbitrators,
to select and agree upon a third arbitrator.
Some laws do not specify the number or arbitrators or simply state that the dispute "be
submitted to arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association." Some require a specific number of arbitrators. For
example, in disputes between automobile liability insurers and the insured, California
Insurance Code, Section 11580.2(f) states that the "arbitration shall be conducted by a
single neutral arbitrator." Others leave the decision to the parties. For example,
California Public Contract Code, Section 10240.3, states that for arbitration to resolve
claims that arise from certain state contracts, "unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the
arbitration shall be conducted by a single arbitrator selected by the parties from the
certified list created by the Public Works Contract Arbitration Committee."
Selecting arbitrators

Unless the parties in arbitration have not already agreed to some other method for
choosing arbitrators, the AAA's method for large, complex commercial cases is to send
each party an identical list of (usually) ten names of potential arbitrators. If the parties
fail to agree on arbitrators from the list, each party may be allowed to strike a fixed
number of names from the list, and rank the remaining names in order of preference. The
AAA will choose the highest-ranked arbitrators that are mutually agreeable to the parties.
Some sections of California law that establish arbitration procedures do not specify how
arbitrators are to be chosen, or state that the arbitrator(s) should be chosen in accordance
with the rules of the AAA. Other sections, however, do specify a process for selecting
arbitrators.
For mandatory arbitration in disputes related to pricing and product quality arising out of
written contracts between manufacturers and contractors, California Labor Code, Section
2686 specifies that the arbitration panel must consist of:
1. A management level representative from a manufacturer in the general geographic
area in which the dispute arises;
2. A representative from the contractors' association whose membership
encompasses the general geographic are in which the dispute arises; and
3. A third party to be chosen and agreed upon by the first two from a list of
arbitrators provided by the American Arbitration Association (AAA). The law
also specifies that the third arbitrator is to act as the chairperson of the panel.
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In the context of redevelopment, a similar structure would require the redevelopment
agency and the challenging party to both select arbitrators. The third arbitrator
selected from a list of potential arbitrators provided by the AAA.

At the request of the California Research Bureau, the AAA conducted an e-mail
to determine the extent to which AAA-affiliated arbitrators in California felt they
necessary expertise and experience to arbitrate redevelopment-related disputes. The
request elicited 18 responses. All respondents reported having experience with
redevelopment and related issues such as eminent domain, tax allocation, land use
planning, and environmental issues.
An alternative to selecting a neutral arbitrator from an AAA list would be to create some
form of state-certified list of potential arbitrators for redevelopment disputes. For
example, for arbitration in disputes between public agencies and contractors, Section
10240 et seq. of the California Public Contract Code requires that the parties select an
arbitrator from a list of certified arbitrators established by the Public Works Contract
Arbitration Committee.

Similarly, California Health and Safety Code, Sections 25356.2 through 25356.10,
provide for an arbitration panel to resolve disputes related to the cleanup of hazardous
substances. "Potentially Responsible Parties" that are assigned a collective share of
responsibility for the hazardous substances at a site exceeding 50 percent may initiate
binding arbitration before three arbitrators selected from CalEP A's Office of
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment's (OEHHA) Hazardous Substance Cleanup
Arbitration Panel. Arbitrators must be approved by OEHHA and must meet statutory
criteria including relevant arbitration experience and expertise in engineering, the
physical, biological, or health sciences, or other relevant experience and qualifications.
Rules and procedures for arbitration proceedings
Arbitration rules and procedures can vary significantly. Consumer and commercial
contracts or agreements often specify elements such as:
•

The method of initiating arbitration;

•

Rules and procedures for pre-hearing motions;

•

Rules for discovery and evidence;

•

The specific laws, regulations and rules and types of evidence that arbitrators
must consider in reaching a decision;

•

Powers of arbitrators, including the power to compel witnesses through subpoena;
and

•

The content of the award and procedures for correcting an award.

When these types of procedures are not spelled out in a contract, or in statutes that
provide for arbitration, they are generally determined by an arbitration administrator
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as the AAA, or by the arbitrator(s) presiding over the proceedings. Some sections of
California Law do specify arbitration procedures.
In arbitration for pricing and product quality disputes arising out of written contracts
between manufacturers and contractors, Section 2689 of the California Labor Code
specifies the following procedures to govern arbitration hearings:
•

The chairperson may issue subpoenas;

•

Each party may be represented by attorneys at their own expense;

•

Formal rules of evidence are not applicable, but any relevant evidence shall be
admitted if it is "evidence upon which responsible persons would rely in the
conduct of serious business affairs;"

•

All testimony shall be taken under oath;

•

No formal written records shall be kept unless one or both parties agrees to
employ at their own expense a qualified court reporter for that purpose;

•

Hearing attendees are limited to the panel, the parties and counsel, a court
reporter, interpreters when requested, and witnesses while testifying;

•

Panel members may allow a period of up to three days at the end of the hearing to
allow parties to submit evidence not available during the course of the hearing.

Section 1299 et seq. of the California Code of Civil Procedure (which provides for
arbitration in labor disputes involving firefighters and police officers) specifies, but does
not limit, factors that the arbitration panel may consider in choosing between the last best
offers made by the disputing parties such as the interest and welfare of the public and the
ability of the employer to meet the costs of the award.
Section 6200(g) of the California Business and Professions Code specifies that arbitrators
presiding over disputes between attorneys and clients may take and hear evidence,
administer oaths and compel witnesses by subpoena.
Similar to decisions about the number of arbitrators and timelines for arbitration
proceedings, decisions about specific arbitration procedures must weigh concerns about
fairness, the necessity of allowing for a thorough hearing of the dispute, cost, and
efficiency.

Responsibility for costs and fees of arbitration proceedings
As with many aspects of arbitration, the responsibility for paying the costs and fees
associated with the proceedings can vary. It may be specified by contract or statute, or
left to the discretion of the presiding arbitrator.
It is common for the costs of the neutral arbitrator and other costs of administering the
arbitration to be divided proportionally among the parties. Generally, each party is

California State Library, California Research Bureau

separately responsible for the fees of their own attorneys and witnesses. But in some
cases, the law may specify otherwise.
In arbitration proceedings to determine the value owed a property owner in eminent
domain cases, Section 1273.020(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure specifies
that the party acquiring the property in question is responsible for all costs associated
with the arbitration proceedings including the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator
and the fees and mileage of all witnesses subpoenaed in the arbitration. Property owners,
however, must pay their own attorney's fees and expert witness fees. This arrangement
serves to safeguard the due process rights of property owners who might otherwise find 1t
difficult to pay the costs of arbitration.
In disputes between a developer and a time-share association, regardless of which party
requests arbitration, Section 11241 ofthe California Business and Professions Code
requires the developer to pay the fee that AAA charges to initiate the arbitration.
Ultimately, the arbitrator determines the cost of arbitration borne by each party in these
cases.
In some types of arbitration, responsibility for some of the costs and fees may depend on
the outcome. For example, in arbitration proceedings for pricing and product quality
disputes arising out of written contracts between manufacturers and contractors, Section
2692 of the California Labor Code specifies that the basic costs of the arbitration
proceeding is to be borne equally by all parties, but that the panel may, as a part of its
award, impose all such costs on the party requesting arbitration if a majority of the panel
determines that the matter brought before it was frivolous. In arbitration to resolve
disputes that arise from public agency contracts, Section 10240.13 of the California
Public Contract Code specifies that the cost of conducting the arbitration shall be borne
equally by the parties, with the exception "that the arbitrator may allow the prevailing
party to recover its costs and necessary disbursements, other than attorney's fees, on the
same basis as is allowed in civil actions."
If one of the purposes of considering the establishment of an arbitration process to settle
disputes related to redevelopment in a manner that is more accessible and less cost
prohibitive to potential challengers, it might be worthwhile to explore the possibility of
shifting some portion of arbitration costs and fees to redevelopment agencies.
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EXPANDED PROJECT AREA COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT
In addition to arbitration, project area committees might work more effectively to
increase local input and oversight with several key changes such as:

•

Broadening the criteria that require redevelopment agencies to form project area
committees;

•

Broadening project area committee membership, possibly to include
representatives of affected taxing agencies;

•

Making it more difficult for redevelopment agencies to override project area
committee recommendations, perhaps allowing the committees to initiate some
form of arbitration proceedings when an impasse is reached with the agency.

Project area committees are currently required for project areas that could potentially
displace significant numbers of low- and moderate-income persons. PAC membership is
limited to elected representatives of residential owner-occupants, residential tenants,
business owners, and existing organizations within the project area. To form PACs,
redevelopment agencies adopt their own procedures for allowing interested individuals
and organizations to file for election, for registering qualified voters from the project
area, and for publicizing and holding elections.
Redevelopment agencies must consult with the P ACs on matters related to the planning
and provision of residential facilities displaced by the project and on other policy matters
affecting residents within the project area. Redevelopment plans must be submitted to a
PAC, which reviews the plans and may prepare a report and make recommendations. If a
PAC recommends against approving a redevelopment plan, the redevelopment agencies
can only adopt the plan if two-thirds of its legislative body vote to do so.
By communicating constituents' concerns to redevelopment agencies and publicizing
opposition to redevelopment, P ACs have the potential to make redevelopment agencies
more accountable to project area residents and businesses. It is also possible that PACs
may play a role in relieving some of the tension surrounding redevelopment. According
to the California Redevelopment Association, PACs not only "play a key role in forming
the direction of the project. They also help bridge the communication gap between the
community and the agency. " 24
San Francisco Bay Area project area committees
Several San Francisco Bay Area examples illustrate how P ACs can exercise some
influence over redevelopment. The South of Market Project Area Committee and the
Bayview-Hunters Point Project Area Committee both operate independent websites that
explain the redevelopment process, describe the history, current status, specific elements
of redevelopment plans, and publicize PAC meetings as well as other news and events of
interest to local residents and businesses.
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Both of these San Francisco P ACs make recommendations to ensure that redevelopment
meets the needs and interests oftheir communities. Recently, the South ofMarket PAC
opposed the redevelopment agency's plans to convert a hotel into low-income apartments
for more than 100 chronically homeless people after local residents expressed concerns
about the project. 25 The Bayview-Hunters Point Project Area Committee has worked
with the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency on amendments related to truck routes,
land use, affordable housing, and the use of eminent domain. 26
Another example of an active Bay Area PAC is the West Oakland Project Area
Committee, which recently voted to pay the first year of rent for a food cooperative in an
area where there is only one full service grocery store. 27 The Committee also
recommended that the city guarantee the second year of rent.
The Russian River Redevelopment Oversight Committee
The Russian River Redevelopment Oversight Committee (RRROC) is not technically a
project area committee. Nonetheless, it is similar in its composition and responsibilities.
Its formation and operation provide a case study of how a committee whose members
include project area residents and businesses might work to influence redevelopment.
In July of 2000, the Sonoma County Board of Supervisors established the Russian River
Redevelopment Plan, which encompasses a 1,800 acre area along the Russian River
between Rio Nido and Villa Grande. Supervisors viewed the plan as an attempt to fund
necessary public projects and revitalize an area prone to flooding and economic
problems. 28 Critics of the plan, however, feared that the Sonoma County Board of
Supervisors would approve redevelopment projects not in keeping with the region's rural
29
setting. Two lawsuits charged that the plan was an illegal effort to benefit developers,
and challenged the county's assertion that the area qualifies as "blighted" and "urban." 30
In response to criticism of the redevelopment plan, Supervisor Mike Reilly developed a
proposal to create a citizens oversight committee that would give local residents and
business owners the authority to approve or veto proposed projects. In July of 2000, a
resolution of the Sonoma County Board of Supervisors created the Russian River
Redevelopment Oversight Committee (RRROC) to participate in the implementation of
the Russian River Redevelopment Plan throughout the plan's duration. Similar in
structure to redevelopment project area committees, the RRROC consists of nine elected
members that serve staggered four-year terms, and who reside in,. or have business
interests in the project area including:

•

Three residential owner occupants;

•

Three residential tenants;

•

Three business operators and/or business property owners.

RRROC members are elected at an election meeting. Any person eligible for RRROC
membership may also vote in a RRROC election. To qualify to vote or serve as a
member of the RRROC, a person must present proof that he or she is a residential

22

California State Library, California Research Bureau

owner/occupant, residential tenant, business operator, or business property owner within
the project area.
In contrast to PACs, the RRROC not only acts in a review and advisory capacity, but may
exercise approvaVveto power over redevelopment agency activities. Without the
affirmative recommendation of the RRROC, the Sonoma County Community
Development Commission (the Sonoma County Community Redevelopment Agency)
may not acquire property or engage in projects that use redevelopment funds. Since its
inception, the RRROC has never exercised its veto power to halt a project that the
redevelopment agency approved. 31 The RRROC, however, has been quite active in
advising the Development Commission and has even proposed small capital projects that
the Commission has approved. 32

In 2001, seven members of the anti-redevelopment Russian River Community Forum,
which had filed two lawsuits to stop redevelopment, were elected to serve on the ninemember RRROC. 33 The two women and five men elected to the RRROC were described
in a newspaper article as a child-care provider, a stained glass artist, a community
activist, a contractor, a psychotherapist, a glass artist, and a website operator. 34
According to a representative from the Sonoma County Community Development
Commission, members of the Commission and the community generally agree that the
RRROC has been a positive experiment. 35 The current chair of the RRROC, a former
member of the Russian River Community Forum shared this sentiment as well. 36 He
admitted, however, that some in the community feel that the RRROC has been co-opted
by redevelopment interests and that some view him and other committee members as
"sell-outs."37
The number of people voting to elect RRROC members has increased over time, and
attendance at RRROC meetings has remained high. 38 And, in this area, that has no other
local government body, RRROC meetings have, according to the RRROC chair and a
representative from Sonoma County's Community Development Committee, become a
vibrant community forum. 39
Are Bay Area PA Cs and the Russian River Redevelopment Oversight Committees
models that can be replicated elsewhere?
Admittedly, Bay Area PACs and Sonoma County's RRROC may be somewhat unique
examples. According to Thomas Hart, Deputy Director of the California Redevelopment
Association, San Francisco P ACs wield significantly more power than those that exist in
other communities. 40 The RRROC appears to be a one-of-a-kind redevelopment
oversight committee in California.
It is possible that Bay Area P ACs and the RRROC are able to play an active role in
shaping the direction of redevelopment because they are able to draw from a base of
community activism that does not necessarily exist in other locales. San Francisco
certainly has a tradition of strong community activism that has influenced local politics,
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and, prior to the formation of the RRROC, the communities in the Russian River
redevelopment project area had already formed the Russian River Community Forum.
In contrast, not all communities have a well established tradition, or network of activist
organizations, from which a PAC might draw. An LAO analysis, for example, found that
local residents and businesses in California rarely pursue redevelopment challenges either
through litigation or the referendum process. 41 When PACs are formed, it might be
difficult to find enough interested persons to participate. In Moorpark, the city council in
2005 voted to proceed with PAC meetings even though they were unable to completely
fill the committee because no one expressed interest in representing the residential tenant
category. 42
It is important to consider whether P ACs could play a significant role even in
communities where the participation of residents and businesses in redevelopment and
other local issues is less well established. It is possible, however, that if P ACs were
structured in a way that gave them more influence or power they could become a more
meaningful tool for local input and oversight in a wide variety of communities.
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APPENDIX: ARBITRATION
WHAT IS ARBITRATION?

Arbitration, like pre-trial settlements and mediation, is a type of alternative dispute
resolution. Arbitration is generally contractual in nature. According to the authors of a
recent book titled Arbitration Law in America (2006), "arbitration rests on a firm
foundation of party autonomy ... A contract is central to the success of party autonomy in
arbitration procedure."43 Arbitration can take different forms, but generally includes
several elements:
•

There is typically an agreement between two or more parties to submit a current
or future dispute to arbitration. The powers of the arbitrator, the arbitrator
selection process, the arbitration forum, the substantive laws or rules that will
apply to the dispute, and other procedural elements of arbitration are defined by
this agreement.

•

There must be a dispute or controversy between parties.

•

An arbitrator, or panel of arbitrators, conducts a process to gather information
from documents, briefings from disputing parties and the testimony of witnesses.

•

Unlike mediation, where a mediator attempts to guide parties to a resolution, the
arbitrator(s) render a decision.

•

The decision and the award made by the arbitrator(s) are generally binding on the
parties.

In the U.S., the popularity of arbitration rose during the industrial revolution. 44
Businesses favored arbitration because of its privacy and because ofthe potential for
quicker, cheaper dispute resolution at the hands of an arbitrator who was often an expert
45
in the industry. In labor disputes, both unions and management also viewed arbitration
as a speedy, fair, and more inexpensive means of resolving disputes. 46
TYPES OF ARBITRATION

In addition to commercial arbitration, which is used to resolve disputes between
commercial entities, arbitration is used in a number of other contexts as well.

Consumer arbitration
Historically in the U.S., arbitration agreements were entered into by two or more business
47
entities. In the late 1800s however, stock exchanges and brokerages began to require
arbitration for claims brought by investors, but beyond the securities industry, arbitration
between consumers and businesses was not common. 48 When the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925, the possibility of arbitration among businesses and
consumers was viewed as inappropriate and fraught with potential problems. 49

California State Library, California Research Bureau

In the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court began to view arbitration more favorably and
reversed earlier decisions that limited the types of claims that contracts could require to
be settled through arbitration. 50 In the 1990s, a broad range of companies began to
require customers to agree to resolve future disputes through arbitration rather than
litigation. 51 The practice is now used by financial institutions, service providers, and
sellers of consumer goods, educational institutions, health care providers, and health
insurers. 52 One study found that in 2001, one-third of the consumer transactions of an
"average person" in Los Angeles were likely covered by an arbitration clause. 53

Although arbitration may be a more accessible means for the typical consumer to resolve
a dispute with a company than litigation, as the practice of adding arbitration clauses to
consumer contracts becomes more ubiquitous, concerns about fairness and equity
abound. According to one consumer advocacy group, arbitration clauses are "the single
biggest threat to consumer rights in recent years, a de-facto rewrite of the Constitution
that undermines a broad range of consumer protections painstakingly built into law." 54
Concerns about consumer arbitration include the following: 55
•

Because there is no requirement that a document containing an arbitration clause
be signed by the consumer, it is likely that many consumers do not read, and are
not aware of, the arbitration clause.

•

Arbitration requirements are sometimes added after a business relationship is
established. For example, credit card companies may send a small-print notice of
a change of policy that requires arbitration after an account has been opened.

•

The broad expansion of consumer arbitration beyond the securities industry
means that a wider class of less-educated consumers is affected by arbitration
clauses.

•

Consumer arbitration clauses tend to favor the company that drafts them, and can
limit consumers' procedural and substantive rights. For example, arbitration
clauses may:

o

Shorten the length oftime that plaintiffs have to bring a dispute.

o

Limit discovery and the types of evidence allowed.

o

Prevent consumers from joining together in a class action.

o

Bar certain types of relief such as punitive damages or attorneys fees.

Due to concerns about these issues, many states have passed legislation to prevent
and protect consumers. In California, for example, several statutes require that
arbitration clauses in certain types of contracts include specific language in upper case
text that clarifies what it means to agree to the arbitration clause. Similarly, the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) has adopted a consumer due process protocol,
which includes provisions that allow consumers to opt into small claims court, and
requires businesses to develop an arbitration process that has a reasonable cost for
consumers. 56 The AAA will not administer arbitration unless businesses substantially
comply with the consumer due process protocol.
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Labor and employment arbitration
With the rise of the labor movement in the U.S. in the 1900s, unions and employers
recognized the need for a speedy, inexpensive, and fair method to resolve disputes that
arose in the context of the modem workplace. 5 7 In 1947, the U.S. Congress enacted the
Labor Management Relations act, which provides for federal court jurisdiction for
purposes of enforcing collective bargaining agreements. Courts have held that the power
to enforce a collective bargaining agreement includes the power to enforce an arbitration
provision in such an agreement. Based on this theory, the Labor Management Relations
Act is the authority that binds parties to labor arbitration.
Professional arbitrators help to establish and apply a system of justice that both the union
and the employer can accept. Because much of labor arbitration is aimed at clarifying
conditions of employment or other details left unspecified in a collective bargaining
agreement, arbitrators serve a law-making function similar to government agencies that
apply and interpret the directions ofthe legislature by issuing regulations. As opposed to
interest arbitration, grievance arbitration occurs when unions and employers employ
arbitration to resolve employee grievances arising under a collective bargaining
agreement.
Employment arbitration includes arbitration agreements contained in an employment
contract between an employee and an employer. As with arbitration agreements in
commercial contracts, the procedures for employment arbitration can vary. Because the
U.S. Supreme Court has decided that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to
employment arbitration, FAA default procedures such as methods for appointing
arbitrators are used when procedures are not specified in the arbitration agreement. 58 As
with consumer arbitration, concerns have been raised that employment arbitration
agreements are more favorable for employers. 59
International arbitration
International arbitration has developed over the fast century as a means of resolving
disputes between parties of different countries. 6 Arbitration avoids the problem of
having one or more parties in a dispute seek judgments in courts in their own countries,
then re-litigating the issues in a court of the other party's jurisdiction to seek enforcement
ofthe judgment.
In 1958, the United Nations published the Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign
61
Arbitral Awards, a multilateral treaty generally known as the "New York Convention."
More than 100 countries have ratified the treaty, which applies to the recognition and
enforcement in one nation's courts of an arbitral award made in another nation. The
treaty calls for the courts of each signatory nation to recognize written arbitration
agreements, to compel parties that have a valid agreement into arbitration when one party
petitions the court to do so, and to recognize and enforce arbitral awards.
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Judicial arbitration
Many state court systems offer some form of judicial arbitration, often for civil cases
involve small claims. In judicial arbitration, a judge orders a legal action into
or the parties and counsel agree to submit the matter for arbitration. An arbitrator,
panel of arbitrators, usually attorneys who are selected from the court's panel of
arbitrators, conducts the arbitration. Typically, either side may request a trial de novo
(new trial) if they are unhappy with the arbitration award.
WHY USE ARBITRATION?

Arbitration is considered to have a number of advantages over litigation in disputes
between private parties. Some of these include:
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•

Arbitration proceedings are generally private. Arbitration sessions are closed
and decisions are not released to anyone other than the parties. Parties to disputes
often find it desirable to keep the findings and the decision private.

•

Parties to an arbitration typically have significant say in choosing an arbitrator.
Parties may agree on an arbitrator or may use a sponsoring organization that
provides a list of potential arbitrators from which they can choose. The ability to
choose an arbitrator is viewed as important for disputes involving complex or
technical matters with which most judges and juries have little experience or
expertise.

•

Arbitration allows for flexible rules. Parties may choose the rules and
procedures that they feel will most likely achieve a fair and efficient resolution.

•

Parties sometimes prefer arbitration because they believe it is cheaper and
Jaster than litigation. Arbitration generally has more streamlined procedures
(e.g., relatively little discovery) that can improve the speed of the decisionmaking process. There is limited research on this, largely because arbitration
tends to be private. Nonetheless, depending on the complexity of a dispute, and
the arbitration rules agreed upon by the parties, it is possible that resolution will
take as long or longer than it would in the courts. There is also evidence that
arbitration can be more costly because in addition paying the costs of attorneys,
disputants must pay the fees of the arbitrators and various administrative costs
that may be higher than that charged by the courts. 62

•

The relative informality of arbitration proceedings are sometimes considered
advantage over litigation. Proceedings typically take place in private
rooms rather than in a court-like setting. Rules of evidence and procedures are
relaxed.

•

The finality and enforcement of binding arbitration are also viewed as
Parties to arbitration have limited rights of appeal. Under the Federal Arbitration
Act and most state laws, factual errors, and even errors oflaw, are not
grounds to vacate an award.
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THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT (FAA): KEY PROVISIONS
In 1925, the U.S. Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) whose
fundamental premise was that agreements to submit disputes to arbitration should be as
enforceable as any other contracts. 63 The FAA applies to transactions and contracts in
which the parties have agreed in writing to submit controversies that arise out of the
contract to arbitration.
Under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the FAA preempts state arbitration
laws, which means that with respect to most transactions, there is "little room for state
arbitration law ."64 Parties subject to the FAA, however, may "opt out" and choose state
arbitration laws to govern the arbitration even when those laws differ from the FAA.
Although most state's arbitration laws are modeled on the Uniform Arbitration Act which
is consistent with the principles of the FAA, some states have enacted legislation,
particularly in the area of consumer arbitration, that gives the courts greater jurisdiction
in matters related to arbitration.
Validity of arbitration agreements
Under the FAA, "arbitrability" generally depends on whether:
1. There is an agreement to arbitrate;
2. The agreement is in the proper form (e.g., written);
3. The dispute is within the scope of the agreement to arbitrate;
4. The agreement to arbitrate is valid (e.g., not induced by fraud); and
5. The dispute is capable of arbitration (as opposed to being required to be heard in
court). 65 The FAA provides that a party may petition a court to order another
party to participate in an arbitration if the court finds that the arbitration
agreement between the parties is valid.

An arbitration agreement may be invalidated, or a court may decide that a party has
waived its right to pursue arbitration, if it can be shown that a party entered into the
agreement due to fraud, if there is pending litigation related to the dispute, or if, as a
matter of public policy, the dispute is "inarbitrable."
Even after the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that certain types of disputes, because they were matters of public policy, could not
be resolved through arbitration. In Wilko v. Swan (1952), for example, the Court held
that the effectiveness of federal securities laws could be impaired if parties were
permitted to consent to arbitration of securities law claims. 66 In subsequent years, the
courts extended this public policy limitation on arbitration. 67
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By the 1980s, however, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a "liberal federal policy"
favoring arbitration and declared that public policy does not preclude arbitration
involving important federal rights. 68 The public policy-based inarbitrability doctrine
today applies to a narrow range of cases that are truly public in character such as
cases, child custody, and bankruptcy. 69
Appointing arbitrators
When an arbitration agreement does not specify the number of arbitrators, a single
arbitrator will typically conduct the arbitration. Commercial arbitration provider
guidelines generally recommend the use of a single arbitrator for smaller cases and a
panel of three arbitrators for larger cases.
The FAA requires that if an arbitration agreement specifies a method for choosing
arbitrators, that method must be followed. If no method is provided, a court may appoint
the arbitrator or arbitrators. In practice, however, the method of selecting arbitrators is
generally specified in an arbitration agreement. 70 The party that drafts the agreement
typically designates a private arbitration provider such as the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) to handle arbitration proceedings. Arbitration providers have
detailed default procedures that they use to appoint arbitrators if the agreement does not
specify another method. 71
Two common methods for choosing arbitrators are the "party-appointed" method and the
"strike and rank" method. In some cases, arbitration agreements allow parties to appoint
arbitrators on their own or from a pre-approved list developed by the parties or by an
arbitration administrator such as the AAA. It should be noted that a party-appointed
arbitrator is generally required to be a neutral arbitrator except in rare cases where the
parties agree beforehand that each will be allowed to appoint an advocate to the panel.
Generally, the two party-appointed arbitrators will then choose a third arbitrator who
serves as the chair of the panel. 72
Under the "strike and rank" method, both parties to a dispute receive an identical list of
the names of potential arbitrators. The parties are given a time-period within which to
strike a fixed number of names from the list and rank the remaining names. The AAA
will then choose the highest ranked arbitrator(s) that is(are) agreeable to both parties.
Subpoenas by arbitrators
The FAA provides that arbitrators may issue subpoenas to compel witnesses to appear, to
testify, and to provide documents. Persons who neglect or refuse to testify before an
arbitration panel may be compelled by a court order.
Confirmillg, vacating, or modifying an award
If the losing party in an arbitration proceeding does not comply with the award,
winning party may seek a court judgment confirming the award. As a court action, the
confirmation of an arbitration award is enforceable. A motion to confirm an award
be filed within one year after the award is made.
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The losing party may file a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award within three
months after the award is filed. However, the FAA provides review for arbitration
awards on the narrow grounds that:
1. The award was procured by corruption or fraud;
2. That there was corruption or evident partiality in the arbitrators;
3. The arbitrators were guilty of misconduct;
4. The arbitrators exceeded their powers. The FAA does provide, however, that a
court may modify or correct an award when an evident mistake was made in
calculating the award.
THE CALIFORNIA ARBITRATION ACT: KEY PROVISIONS

When contracts to arbitrate affect interstate commerce, the (FAA) applies. 73 But because
disputes arising from redevelopment agency activities within California are truly
intrastate in nature, and would thus be subject to state laws, this section provides an
overview of the California Arbitration Act. California's general arbitration statutes are
contained in Title 9 of the Code of Civil Procedures, Sections 1280 through 1294.2.
Validity of arbitration agreements

Under California Law, a written agreement to arbitrate is "valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract." If an
arbitration agreement exists, one party may petition the court to compel arbitration. The
court may invalidate the arbitration agreement only if it finds that:
1. The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner;

2. Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; and
3. A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or
special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series
of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a
common issue of law or fact.
Class arbitration

Although the Federal Arbitration Act does not recognize or provide for class actions in
arbitration cases, Section 1281.3 of the California Code of Civil Procedure allows a party
to an arbitration agreement to petition the court to consolidate separate arbitration
proceedings, and states that the court may order consolidation of separate arbitration
proceedings when:
1. Separate arbitration agreements or proceedings exist between the same parties; or
one party is a party to a separate arbitration agreement or proceeding with a third
party;
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2. The disputes arise from the same transactions or series of related transactions; and
3. There is common issue or issues of law or fact creating the possibility of
conflicting rulings by more than one arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
Appointment and (dis)qualification of arbitrators
Section 1281.6 provides that the method of choosing an arbitrator specified in the
arbitration agreement will be followed. When the arbitration agreement does not suggest
a particular method for appointing arbitrators, the court will appoint an arbitrator. The
court will nominate five people from lists provided by the parties seeking arbitration. If
the parties still cannot decide on an arbitrator within five days, the court appoints an
arbitrator from the nominees.
Sections 1281.85 through 1281.96 prescribe the qualifications of arbitrators. Persons
serving as neutral arbitrators must comply with ethical standards adopted by the Judicial
Council and must disclose financial, professional, and other potential conflicts of interest.
Private arbitration firms are prohibited from administering any type of consumer
arbitration if they have had a financial interest in any party or attorney for a party within
the preceding year. Private arbitration companies that administer consumer arbitration
must publish a searchable, public list of all consumer arbitration proceedings they have
administered. Entries for each proceeding must include information such as the parties
involved, the nature of the dispute, and the prevailing party.
Confirming, vacating, or modifying an award
California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1285 provides that a party to an arbitration in
which an award has been made may petition the court to confirm, correct, or vacate the
award. Similar to the Federal Arbitration Act, Section 1286.4 specifies that a court may
vacate an award if it finds that:
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•

The award was procured by corruption or fraud;

•

There was corruption on the part of the arbitrators;

•

The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the misconduct of a
neutral arbitrator;

•

The arbitrators exceeded their powers;

•

The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the
arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause or by the refusal of the
arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy "or by other conduct of the
arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title;"

•

An arbitrator making the award failed to disclose reasons that may have been
grounds for disqualification.
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Section 1286.6 provides that the court may correct an arbitration award if it determines
that:
1. There was a miscalculation of figures or an "evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award:"
2. The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
3. The award is "imperfect in a .matter of form, not affecting the merits of the
controversy."
Section 1288 requires that a petition to confirm an award be served and filed within four
years after the date of the award, and that a petition to vacate an award or to correct an
award be served no later than 100 days after the date of the award.

California State Library, California Research Bureau

34

California State Library, California Research Bureau

NOTES
1

545 U.S. 469 (2005).

2

California Redevelopment Association Bill Analysis, July 6, 1993; http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/9394/bi!Vasm/ab 1251-1300/ab 1290 cfa California State Library, California Research Bureau
93090 I 151805 sen floor.
3

Beatty, David Fetal., 2004, Redevelopment in California (Third Edition), Solano Press Books: Point
Arena California, p. 9.
4

"Redevelopment and Blight: Briefing Paper for the Joint Interim Hearing," Senate Committee on Local
Government, October 2005, p. 5.
5

O'Malley, Marianne, "Redevelopment after Reform: A Preliminary Look," California Legislative
Analyst's Office, December 1994, p. 11.
6

California Health and Safety Code, Section 33378(b) (2).

7

O'Malley, Marianne, "Redevelopment after Reform: A Preliminary Look," California Legislative
Analyst's Office, December 1994, p. 13.
8

California Health and Safety Code, Section 33080 et seq.

9

"State Oversight of Redevelopment," Legislative Analyst's Office, November 2005, p. 3.

°California Health and Safety Code, section 33385 et seq.

1

11

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Sternlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3-4.
12

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 6.

13

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Sternlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 7.
14

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 6.

15

California Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 1273 et seq.

16

Brunet, Edward, Richard E. Speidel, Jean R. Sternlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University press. pp. 3-4.
17

Bennett, Stevern C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 6.

18

E-mail correspondence from Dwight James, District Vice President, American Arbitration Association,
San Francisco, October 31, 2006.
19

Senate Local Government Committee Bill Analysis, AB 818 (Leslie, 2005) City Annexations, and
Property Tax Exchanges, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab 08010850/ab 818 cfa 20050610 090157 sen comm.html.
20

O'Malley, Marianne, "Redevelopment after Reform: A Preliminary Look,'' California Legislative
Analyst's Office, December 1994, p. 11.
21

13 Cal. App. 4th 1035 (1993).

22

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 50.

23

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 50.

California Research Bureau, California State Library

24

California Redevelopment Association website, viewed on December 6, 2006,
http://69 .63.138.11/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTE
NTID=1710.
25

Gonzalez, Carlos Avila, "On S.F. 's Sixth Street, enough is enough: Neighbors complain about city's plan
to fill rebuilt hotel with hard-core homeless," The San Francisco Chronicle, December 3, 2005.
26

Bayview Hunters Point Project Area Committee website, http://www.bvhp-pac.org/, viewed December.
6, 2006. See also; Goodyear, Charlie, "Bayview renewal approved," The San Francisco Chronicle, May
17, 2006.
27

Burt, Cecily, "New food cooperative taking shape," The Alameda Times-Star, March 13, 2006.

28

"River plan Reilly's compromise gives residents what they've asked for
Press Democrat, July 11, 2000.

control," The (Santa Rosa)

29

"River plan Reilly's compromise gives residents what they've asked for- control," The (Santa Rosa)
Press Democrat, July 11, 2000.
30

Weiser, Matt, "Two lawsuits threaten Russian River plan area's redevelopment status, EIR questioned,"
The (Santa Rosa) Press Democrat, August 25, 2000.

31

Telephone interview with Kathleen H. Kane, Executive Director, Sonoma County Community
Development Commission, Sept. 28, 2006; and telephone interview with Dan Fein, Chair, Russian River
Redevelopment Oversight Committee, October 25, 2006.
32

Telephone interview with Kathleen H. Kane, Executive Director, Sonoma County Community
Development Commission, September 28, 2006.
33

Benfell, Carol, "Newly elected members to powerful oversight panel say they oppose county plan," The
(Santa Rosa) Press Democrat, December 11, 2001.
M

.

Benfell, Carol, "Newly elected members to powerful oversight panel say they oppose county plan," The
(Santa Rosa) Press Democrat, December 11, 2001.

35 Telephone conversation with Kathleen H. Kane, Executive Director, Sonoma County Community
Development Commission, October 5, 2006.
36

Telephone interview with Dan Fein, Chair, Russian River Redevelopment Oversight Committee,
October 25, 2006.
37

Telephone interview with Dan Fein, Chair, Russian River Redevelopment Oversight Committee,
October 25, 2006.
38

Telephone interview with Kathleen H. Kane, Executive Director, Sonoma County Community
Development Commission, September 28, 2006; and telephone interview with Dan Fein, Chair, Russian
River Redevelopment Oversight Committee, October 25, 2006.

39

Telephone interview with Kathleen H. Kane, Executive Director, Sonoma County Community
Development Commission, September 28, 2006; and telephone interview with Dan Fein, Chair, Russian
River Redevelopment Oversight Committee, October 25, 2006.
40

Interview with Thomas Hart, Deputy Director, California Redevelopment Association, July 12, 2006.

41

O'Malley, Marianne, "Redevelopment after Reform: A Preliminary Look," California Legislative
Analyst's Office, December, 1994, p. 13.

42

Bakalis, Ann, "City council to consider request from Project Area Committee to cover three extra
issues," The Ventura County Star, December 20, 2005.

36

California State Library, California Research Bureau

43

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Sternlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3, 4.

44

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p.9.

45

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Stemlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p.l27.
46

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 10.

47

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Stemlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 127.

48

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Stemlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 128.
49

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Stemlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 129.
50

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Stemlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 129.
51

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Stemlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 129.
52

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Stemlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 129.
53

Demaine, Linda and Deborah Hensler, "'Volunteering' to arbitrate through predispute arbitration clauses:
The average consumer's experience," 67 Law and Contemporary Problems 55 (2004).
54

National Consumer Law Center Inc. Press Release July 28, 2003, "Consumer and Media Alert: The
Small Print That's Devastating Major Consumer Rights," at www.consumerlaw.org, accessed on July 17,
2006.
55

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Stemlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 130-146.
56

American Arbitration Association Consumer Due Process Protocol,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019#PRTNCIPLE 5. SMALL CLAIMS, viewed January 2, 2007.

57

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 10.

58

532 U.S. 105, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001).

59

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 158.

60

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 133.

61

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 134.

62

"The cost of arbitration," Public Citizen, May I 0, 2002,
http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7173&seciD= 1052&catiD= 126.

63

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts.56 p. 10.

64

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Stemlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 38.

65

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Stemlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 34.
66

346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953).

California Research Bureau, California State Library

67

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 63.

68

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 64.

69

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 64.

70

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 23.

71

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 23.

72

Bennett, Steven C. 2002. Arbitration: Essential Concepts. ALM Publishing: New York. p. 49.

73

Brunet, Edward, Richard e. Speidel, Jean R. Sternlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 2006. Arbitration Law in
America: A Critical Assessment. New York: Cambridge University Press. p. 63. This principle was
established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995).

38

California State Library, California Research Bureau

